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INTRODUCTION 
“He seemed like a completely regular customer until afterwards,” Rachel 
said of her experience with a police officer.1  Rachel, an Alaskan prostitute, 
had posted an escort ad online and quickly received a reply from a man.2  
Unbeknownst to her at the time, Rachel was setting herself up with a police 
officer who was conducting an undercover sting operation on her.3  After the 
sexual encounter was concluded, the man identified himself as a cop and 
attempted to arrest Rachel.4  Thinking quickly, she stated that the sexual 
contact was not conducted for business but for pleasure, and she 
subsequently ran to her car leaving the money payment behind.5  After the 
encounter, Rachel stated, “I felt violated.  It was a horrible experience.  It 
was like, because he had a badge, it was okay—he could just do it.”6 
Unfortunately, Rachel’s story is not unique.7  Sex work, specifically 
prostitution, is one of the lowest-level offenses in the criminal code, and yet 
prostitutes in the United States often face the most severe abuse and unjust 
treatment by police officers.8  The legal definition of prostitution often sets 
an incredibly low standard for an arrest, where prostitutes are arrested merely 
by agreeing or implying to participate in a transaction without actually 
having any sort of sexual activity for payment.9  This low bar for prostitution 
 
 1. See Sirian Kale, Police Are Allegedly Sleeping with Sex Workers Before 
Arresting Them, VICE (May 3, 2017), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/59mbkx/ 
police-are-allegedly-sleeping-with-sex-workers-before-arresting-them (describing how 
a prostitute felt violated when discovering that her client was actually an undercover 
police officer). 
 2. See id. (describing how Rachel inadvertently contacted a police officer). 
 3. See id. (stating how Rachel answered a “hotel out-call” after she received a 
response on an online advertisement she posted). 
 4. See id. (explaining how the police officer told Rachel he was going to arrest her 
after they had sex to completion). 
 5. See id. (describing how Rachel tried to justify the sexual encounter with the 
police officer to avoid being arrested). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Urban Justice Center, Revolving Door: An Analysis of Street-Based 
Prostitution in New York City (2003), http://sexworkersproject.org/downloads/ 
RevolvingDoor.pdf (explaining that thirty percent of survey respondents said they had 
been threatened with violence by police officers and twenty-seven percent described 
police officer sexual harassment). 
 8. See MELISSA HOPE DITMORE, PROSTITUTION AND SEX WORK, at xxiii (2011) 
(explaining that prostitutes are very vulnerable in society because they often cannot seek 
help from the police since their form of employment is criminalized). 
 9. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.00 (McKinney 1967) (stating that a mere agreement 
or offer to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee is considered 
2
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol28/iss3/4
2020] HOW FAR SHOULD POLICE GO 473 
 
is harmful because it gives police officers the power to arrest suspects who 
have not engaged in the actual transaction of sexual activity for payment.10 
The legal standard is not the only issue. Another significant problem is 
sexual contact between police officers and the prostitutes that they 
investigate.11  Police officers face a significant hurdle when working 
prostitution stings because undercover police officers need to act like 
credible “johns.”12  Many undercover police officers participate in sexual 
contact with prostitutes to deceive prostitutes into believing that they are 
legitimate clients, subsequently arrest them, and then utilize the sexual 
contact and exchange of money as evidence.13  Not only is this practice 
invasive, but it also brings up significant issues of prostitutes’ due process 
rights.14  The Constitution grants people the right to bodily integrity, and 
these investigatory procedures specifically violate a suspected prostitute’s 
right to bodily autonomy by attaining sexual contact through fraudulent 
means.15 
This Comment argues that to accurately prove the crime of prostitution the 
law must require sexual contact in exchange of payment.16  But in the context 
of undercover sting operations, an undercover police officer’s sexual contact 
with a prostitute violates the prostitute’s, or suspected prostitute’s, due 
process rights.17  This paradox calls for the prohibition of undercover sting 
 
prostitution). 
 10. See id. (asserting that the physical act of sex in exchange for payment is not 
necessary to prove prostitution). 
 11. See Kelley Frances Stieler, The Government Ménage à Trois: Unraveling the 
Government Sex Partner in Undercover Prostitution Stings, 15 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & 
SOC. JUST. 453, 455 (2009) (quoting “news articles across the country have reported 
cases where sexual contact occurred during prostitution sting operations”). 
 12. See Phillip Walters, Would a Cop Do This: Ending the Practice of Sexual 
Sampling in Prostitution Stings, 29 Law & Ineq. 451, 453 (2011) (stating that officers 
engage in sexual conduct with prostitutes to avoid being uncovered as police officers). 
 13. See id. (explaining how undercover police officers have been willing to engage 
in sexual conduct with prostitutes in order to obtain evidence against them). 
 14. See Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, 983 A.2d 784, 785 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) 
(positing whether the police and their confidential informant’s engagement in sexual acts 
with plaintiff four times were outrageous enough to violate the plaintiff’s right to due 
process). 
 15. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705 (1997) (stating that the 
Constitution places limits on a state’s right to interfere with a person’s decisions about 
bodily integrity). 
 16. See infra Part II (C) (asserting that requiring an exchange of payment for sexual 
contact more accurately represents the crime of prostitution). 
 17. See infra Part II (B) (explaining that the invasiveness of sexual contact directly 
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operations when used to uncover prostitution because there is no efficient or 
effective means of utilizing an undercover prostitution sting to arrest 
suspected prostitutes without violating the suspect’s due process right to 
bodily integrity.18  Part I will provide a legal definition of prostitution and 
the elements necessary to prove the crime.19  Part I will also discuss how 
consent is affected when police officers lie to suspects about their 
identities.20  Lastly, Part I will compare different prostitution laws and cases 
dealing directly with sexual contact to demonstrate the pervasiveness of this 
police practice.21  Part II will analyze the different jurisprudential approaches 
to sexual contact between police officers and prostitutes, specifically the 
tests utilized by the courts to understand police officers’ role in investigating 
prostitution.22  The analysis will focus on the legal standard for prostitution 
and explain that the standard is too expansive because it unfairly targets 
people who have not actually committed the act that the law is trying to 
eliminate.23  Part III will propose a new, heightened standard which narrows 
the legal elements of prostitution to the actual exchange of payment for 
sexual activity.24  Additionally, Part III will discuss a possible solution to the 
vexing problem of sexual contact during prostitution investigation: the 
elimination of undercover prostitution stings.25  Part IV will summarize the 
importance of actual sexual contact in exchange for payment to prove 
prostitution while reiterating that undercover police officers should not use 
this standard to initiate sexual contact with prostitutes because it is a 
 
involves bodily integrity). 
 18. See infra Part III (concluding that sexual contact between an undercover police 
officer and a suspect is a violation of the suspect’s due process right to bodily integrity). 
 19. See infra Part I (A) (discussing the legal definition of prostitution and the 
elements needed to prove the crime). 
 20. See infra Part I (B) (posing the complex problem of consent within the context 
of sexual contact between police officers and the suspected prostitutes that they 
investigate). 
 21. See infra Part I (C) (citing different instances and cases where police officers 
have participated in sexual contact with suspected prostitutes). 
 22. See infra Part II (A) (focusing on the Cuervelo three-part Test to determine 
government outrageousness and the Burkland outrageousness analysis). 
 23. See infra Part II (C) (stating that having such a low legal standard to establish 
the crime of prostitution allows police officers to arrest without the exchange of payment 
for sexual activity). 
 24. See infra Part III (stating that a new definition should require an actual exchange 
of payment for sexual contact or services). 
 25. See infra Part III (explaining that eliminating undercover stings for prostitution 
would be an effective way of solving the problem of sexual contact between police 
officers and suspected prostitutes). 
4
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violation of a suspected prostitute’s due process rights.26 
I. BACKGROUND 
A.  Defining “Sex Worker” and “Prostitute” 
The contemporary term “sex work” casts a wide umbrella that covers a 
variety of different activities. It is necessary to define it to be able to 
accurately and effectively discuss its legal impact.27  The term sex work 
refers to adults who “exchange sexual services for money which necessarily, 
but not exclusively, include direct physical sexual contact with clients.”28  
Sex work can include prostitution, stripping, pornography, phone sex, escort 
services, and erotic masseurs.29 
This Comment will focus specifically on the crime of prostitution, one 
form of sex work.30  Although modern sex workers’ rights groups prefer the 
term “sex worker,” this Comment will use the term “prostitute” to 
differentiate from other forms of sex work.31  State and local laws in forty-
nine states, as well as four Nevada counties, prohibit prostitution.32  The legal 
consequences for prostitution vary by jurisdiction, but generally prostitution 
is considered a misdemeanor and the punishment ranges from a fine to 
imprisonment for up to two years.33 
Many jurisdictions now require an exchange of money and an offer for 
sexual activity to prove prostitution—no sexual contact is necessary.34  
 
 26. See infra Part IV (concluding that sexual contact by undercover police officers 
during prostitution stings should be considered outrageous behavior and banned). 
 27. See DITMORE, supra note 8, at xviii-xix (explaining how sex work can 
encompass a variety of different types of professions, such as street prostitution, 
stripping, or escorting services). 
 28. See Sex Work 101, PEERS VICTORIA RESOURCES SOCIETY (Sep. 30, 2019), 
https://www.safersexwork.ca/sex-work-101/ (explaining the contemporary definition of 
sex work). 
 29. See id. (explaining that those who exchange sexual services for money include a 
variety of different professions). 
 30. See id. (listing different types of sex work). 
 31. See DITMORE, supra note 8, at xviii-xix (clarifying that the term “prostitution” is 
more accurate for academic and historical purposes). 
 32. See Prostitution, Definitions of Prostitution, JUSTIA (Sep. 30, 2019), 
https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/sex-crimes/prostitution (stating that 
prostitution is banned throughout the United States, except in twelve of Nevada’s sixteen 
counties). 
 33. See 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5902 (West 2012) (defining 
prostitution in the first, second, and third degree as misdemeanor crimes). 
 34. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.321 (West 2011) (asserting that “prostitution” 
5
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Although the courts have held that contact is unnecessary to prove 
prostitution, officers still use sexual contact to gather more evidence to prove 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and avoiding “cop checking.”35  Most 
states have outlawed actual intercourse in undercover sting operations, but 
courts have not set many boundaries regarding other types of sexual contact 
in undercover prostitution sting operations.36 
B.  Consent and Prostitution 
It is necessary to understand the role of consent when police officers 
investigate prostitution.37  When discussing sex and intercourse, the majority 
of states have agreed that a person can withdraw consent.38  In many cases, 
consent can be key in analyzing whether there has been a violation of due 
process rights.39  Since consent is revocable, it is possible that a prostitute 
agrees to have sex in exchange for money, but revokes consent before the 
sexual act can occur.40  In this scenario, a suspect has not engaged in an 
exchange of money for a sexual act, removing the reason for an arrest.41  It 
 
means being hired, offering to be hired, or agreeing to be hired by another individual to 
engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact). 
 35. See Sam Eifling, Above the Law, Under the Sheets, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 28, 
2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/120879/ can-police-legally-have-sex-prostitutes-
only-michigan (defining “cop-checking” as when a prostitute initiates sexual contact to 
determine whether the person is a client or a cop). 
 36. See Dylan Sagelbaum, ‘At What Point do They Stop?’ Tactics in Prostitution 
Stings Raise Questions in Pa., YORK DAILY RECORD (May 6, 2019), https:// 
www.ydr.com/story/news/watchdog/2019/05/06/investigation-undercover-prostitution-
sting-cases-pennsylvania-police/3344293002/ (discussing how the lack of policies and 
standards have created a lack of boundaries for police departments). 
 37. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2019) (stating that consent requires the 
person to act voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction 
involved); see also Rachael Urbansky, Seducing the Target: Sexual Intercourse as 
Outrageous Government Conduct, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 729, 740, 752 (2000) 
(stating that “consent obtained through fraud or misrepresentation can be viewed as non-
consent in some circumstances”). 
 38. See § 609.321 (stating that consent must be freely given to perform a sexual act). 
 39. See generally Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (discussing that 
police officers must not use methods that offend the Due Process Clause). 
 40. See § 261.6 (explaining that consent can be revocable at any time since consent 
must be voluntary). 
 41. See Commonwealth v. DeStefanis, 658 A.2d 416, 420 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) 
(asserting that the “mere offer” is dispositive to prove prostitution, and that no touching 
needs to occur); see also People v. Costello, 395 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (Sup. Ct. 1977) 
(stating that a person can be guilty of prostitution when they agree or offer to engage in 
sexual conduct in return for payment). 
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is also important to analyze whether consent is possible when an undercover 
police officer misrepresents himself to attain a prostitute’s consent, then 
engaging in sexual contact.42  Consent obtained through fraudulent means 
and misrepresentations can hardly count as actual consent; a prostitute is 
unaware that the person they are having sexual contact with will 
subsequently arrest them.43 
C.  Vice Cops and Undercover Sting Operations 
To fully understand the complicated and amorphous legal history of 
prostitution and criminal law, we must understand the investigatory context 
of prostitution and police officers.44  Attempting to police prostitution has 
proved more difficult than other crimes.45  A significant issue arising from 
attempts to police prostitution is the fact that it tends to be a consensual act 
between two adults.46  Additionally, the transaction of sex or sexual contact 
is usually done in private.47  To combat this difficulty, police officers have 
set up “undercover stings” to break up prostitution rings and make arrests.48  
In these undercover stings, police officers will pose as “johns” and solicit 
sex in exchange for money from the suspects to prove they are in fact 
engaging in prostitution.49 
In these situations, many prostitutes have the erroneous belief that 
undercover police officers will not participate or engage in sexual contact 
with them.50  Prostitutes have therefore begun asking potential “johns” to 
 
 42. See State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 664 (Iowa 2018) (holding that if a 
person’s consent to engage in a sexual encounter was obtained through the other actor’s 
fraudulent misrepresentations that he is someone else there is no consent). 
 43. See id. at 673 (concluding that the identity of a sexual partner is significant 
because people must be free to decide who their sexual partners will be). 
 44. See generally Stieler, supra note 11, at 463 (explaining how law enforcement 
can be problematic in its enforcement of prostitution bans). 
 45. See Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 
163, 164 (1976) (explaining that police have had to utilize undercover police officers to 
expose acts of prostitution). 
 46. See id. (asserting that consensual prostitution is hard to detect since the crime 
usually occurs in private). 
 47. See id. (stating that prostitution is difficult to detect because none of the 
participants are likely to complain). 
 48. See Walters, supra note 12, at 453 (stating that undercover police officers are 
willing to engage in sexual contact with prostitutes in order to obtain evidence against 
them). 
 49. See id. at 462 (arguing that some police officers believe it is necessary to engage 
in sexual contact with suspected prostitutes to dispel suspicion). 
 50. See State v. Crist, 281 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Minn. 1979) (finding that a defendant 
7
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engage in some type of sexual contact to prove whether or not they are 
undercover police officers.51  Prostitutes believe that an officer will refuse 
this contact, but in reality, law enforcement agencies and courts frequently 
allow undercover police officers to engage in sexual contact in order to prove 
the crime of prostitution.52 
Police departments rarely write policies to ensure that prostitution 
investigations are conducted properly or to explain the extent to which police 
officers must go in order to pose as “credible customers to prostitutes.”53  A 
York Daily Record/Sunday News investigation into police behavior during 
undercover prostitution stings in Pennsylvania found several recent cases 
raising questions about police behavior concerning their conduct of arresting 
prostitutes to “successfully prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”54  
The investigation demonstrated that the lack of written policies in police 
departments and the investigative scope that police officers have attained 
within these investigations have created the potential for abuse of 
prostitutes.55  Ultimately, this sexual contact is tantamount to a violation of 
the suspect’s due process rights.56  In federal court, if the government 
violates a protected right of the defendant because of outrageous government 
conduct, due process principles bar the government from invoking the 
judicial process to obtain a conviction.57  The concept of due process refers 
to fundamental fairness and, although not easily defined, one can infer due 
process to mean that a person under suspicion of a crime is entitled to a just 
process of investigation.58  Although lower courts have used the principle of 
 
asked an undercover officer to expose his penis to her as proof he was not a police 
officer). 
 51. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 464 n.3939 (describing an instance of “cop-
checking” when an undercover police officer convinced a prostitute he was not a cop by 
touching her breast). 
 52. See Kale, supra note 1 (explaining that it is not specifically illegal for police 
officers in many states to have sexual contact with prostitutes during sting operations). 
 53. See Sagelbaum, supra note 36 (stating that police departments often do not 
outline what conduct is prohibited in an undercover prostitution sting). 
 54. See id. (investigating cases where undercover police officers have engaged in 
sexual contact with suspects). 
 55. See id. (stating that the lack of policies allow police officers to victimize suspects 
when investigating prostitution). 
 56. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the officers’ 
behavior was so shocking that it violated the Constitution). 
 57. See United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (asserting that 
if police officers utilize methods that violate a suspect’s due process rights, the courts 
can ban the government from convicting the suspect of the crime). 
 58. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., 
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“outrageousness,” the Supreme Court has been wary to define what would 
be considered “outrageous” enough to violate a suspect’s due process 
rights.59 Additionally, courts have been reluctant to hear due process 
arguments in the case of prostitution and sexual contact.60  It is necessary to 
understand that when police officers utilize sexual contact when 
investigating prostitutes, they are violating the suspected prostitutes’ due 
process rights and depriving them of their bodily integrity by participating 
in contact that is ultimately not necessary to prove the crime.61 
D.  Minnesota’s Impact on the Legal Analysis of Sexual Contact Between 
Police Officers and Suspects 
Notwithstanding that violations have occurred across the states, 
Minnesota is notorious for the impropriety of its police officers when 
investigating prostitution.62  Several cases demonstrate that police officers in 
Minnesota often use sexual contact as an investigative tool during 
undercover operations.63 Minnesota is often discussed within the context of 
sexual contact during undercover prostitution stings because the cases 
United States v. Cuervelo and State v. Burkland helped establish one of the 
few jurisprudential standards regarding acceptable sexual behavior between 
police officers and suspects.64 
In Cuervelo, the Second Circuit developed a test to determine whether 
sexual contact between a police officer and a suspect is appropriate or 
 
concurring) (stating that police conduct used to ensnare suspects into committing crime 
is not to be tolerated). 
 59. See State v. Morris, 272 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn. 1978) (explaining that the 
Supreme Court has never defined what constitutes a violation of due process under the 
outrageousness standard). 
 60. See United States v. Jones, 13 F.3d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts 
have ubiquitously rejected the application of the outrageous conduct defense). 
 61. See Does v. District of Columbia, 374 F. Supp. 2d 107, 118 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(holding that the right to bodily integrity is of “constitutional magnitude”). 
 62. See Walters, supra note 12, at 464-66 (discussing prominent Minnesota cases 
that deal with prostitutes and sexual contact between prostitutes and law enforcement). 
 63. See United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) (establishing a 
test to determine whether a sexual relationship between a suspect and a government agent 
is outrageous); see also State v. Burkland, 775 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) 
(describing how an officer initiated sexual contact by touching a prostitute’s breast). 
 64. See Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 567 (establishing a three-part test to determine if 
sexual contact by government agents is outrageous); see also Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 
374 (establishing analyses that focuses on the outrageousness of the government 
conduct). 
9
Torres: Sexual Contact Between A Suspect and Police Officers: How Far Sho
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2020
480 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 28:3 
 
“outrageous.”65  The court stated that police officers engaged in outrageous 
behavior when utilizing sexual contact during investigations if: (1) the 
government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its investigatory 
arsenal, or acquiesced in such conduct for its own purposes upon learning 
that such a relationship existed; (2) the government agent initiated a sexual 
relationship, or allowed it to continue to exist, to achieve governmental ends; 
and (3) the sexual relationship took place during or close to the period 
covered by the indictment and was entwined with the events charged 
therein.66 
The Burkland court used parts of the Cuervelo Test in its reasoning, and 
ultimately ruled that a police officer’s conduct in the investigation, of which 
included sexual contact with a suspected prostitute, was outrageous enough 
to violate the suspect’s due process rights.67  The Burkland court mainly 
utilized part (2) of the Cuervelo Test in its reasoning, stating that the police 
officer’s conduct was outrageous because he initiated the sexual contact with 
the suspected prostitute when it was not required or necessary in the 
investigation.68 
In Burkland, the court defined the incident at hand as “outrageous” 
conduct but ultimately did not provide an exhaustive list.69  The court held 
in favor of the suspect and stated that the officer’s behavior was a violation 
of the suspect’s due process rights, but the ruling was very limited.70  The 
only reason that the court held that the officer violated the suspect’s due 
process rights was because he initiated sexual contact, not because of the 
officer engaging in sexual contact in and of itself.71  In fact, in Burkland, the 
 
 65. See Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 567 (explaining the test for outrageous government 
conduct in regard to sexual contact with suspects). 
 66. See id. (elaborating on the three different components that the court determined 
were key elements to analyzing government behavior). 
 67. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating, “nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law); see also Burkland, 775 N.W.2d 
at 376 (holding that there was no evidence that “Burkland’s conduct was necessary to 
dispel a suspicion that he was a police officer,” and there is no evidence that it was 
necessary for the collection of evidence to initiate sexual contact). 
 68. See Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 376 (utilizing part 3 of the Cuervelo 
outrageousness Test by identifying that the police officer initiated sexual contact for his 
own pleasure). 
 69. See generally id. at 372 (refusing to give examples of other types of conduct that 
would fall under the “outrageous” category). 
 70. See id. at 376 (holding that the outrageous behavior in this case was limited to 
when the investigating officer initiated and permitted the escalation of sexual contact that 
was unnecessary to any reasonable investigation). 
 71. See id. (concluding that when a police officer’s conduct in a prostitution 
10
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officer did engage in other sexual contact, but the court found it permissible 
because the suspect initiated the contact and not the officer.72  Ultimately, 
the ruling in Burkland is not enough because the issue of sexual contact is 
still present.73 
II. ANALYSIS 
A.  The Cuervelo Test and the Burkland Analysis Do Not Protect 
Prostitutes Enough Because They Do Not Accurately Define 
“Outrageousness” 
The test established by Cuervelo and subsequently partly used in Burkland 
does not protect prostitutes’ Constitutional rights because it does not define 
“outrageousness” effectively.74  While the Cuervelo Test and the Burkland 
Analysis led to a significant victory in some cases, the “bright line” rule 
necessary for effective oversight of the murky territory of undercover police 
operations is not defined, and it is unclear whether it addresses sexual 
conduct short of intercourse.75  While analyzing Cuervelo, the district court 
stated that the standard for dismissal of a case based on outrageous conduct 
is strict, but it failed to see the legal implications of sexual contact.76  By 
implementing a strict interpretation of outrageousness and only providing 
nonspecific factors to evaluate the outrageousness defense, the courts give 
police officers a blank check to operate with relative impunity.77 
 
investigation involves the initiation of sexual contact that is not required for the 
collection of evidence, the conduct is a violation of due process). 
 72. See id. (holding that the first initial hour-long massage which Burkland offered 
to perform topless for an additional $30 was not considered “outrageous”). 
 73. See id. (reversing appellant’s conviction only because the police officer initiated 
and permitted the escalation of sexual contact that was unnecessary). 
 74. See United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
due process principles may bar the government from obtaining a conviction only if the 
government’s conduct “reach[ed] a demonstrable level of outrageousness”); see also 
Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 376 (holding that the police officer’s conduct was sufficiently 
outrageous to violate the “concept of fundamental fairness” in the guarantee of due 
process). 
 75. See Commonwealth v. Chon, 983 A.2d 784, 789 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (holding 
that the government’s conduct was “sufficiently outrageous” to dismiss charges where a 
confidential informant was suspected to have had sexual intercourse four times with 
suspected prostitute). 
 76. See Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 563 (citing the district court’s reasoning that there is a 
very strict standard for the dismissal of an indictment based on outrageous conduct). 
 77. See id. (stating that the bar for a suspect to successfully assert an outrageous 
government conduct defense is high). 
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In Burkland, the court faces the issue of vagueness that was present in 
Cuervelo.78  The court in Burkland recognized a violation of the suspect’s 
due process rights.79  Ultimately, the Burkland court did not specify a 
threshold demarcating outrageous conduct.80  Instead, the Burkland court 
determined that the officer initiated unnecessary sexual contact.81  However 
the court did not analyze the actual contact, did not determine what type of 
conduct is or is not violative, and simply provided a general notion of what 
it considered outrageous conduct.82  Instead of utilizing the test set out in 
Cuervelo, albeit general, the Burkland court only underscores the necessity 
of due process protection and reiterates the notions of fundamental fairness 
necessary when conducting undercover operations.83 
In Burkland, the court compares a prostitution investigation with a 
controlled-substance investigation.84  The court explains that the nature of a 
controlled-substance investigation differs from a prostitution investigation 
because an illegal drug sale is similar to an ordinary commercial transaction, 
except that it involves an illegal substance, while a sex-for-money exchange 
involves intimate activities between the buyer and seller.85  This was a 
successful first step in the court’s analysis because it differentiates physical 
and sexual contact from other forms of investigative tools and methods.86  By 
 
 78. See Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 374 (holding that due process protection prevents 
a conviction if police conduct reaches a demonstrable level of outrageousness). 
 79. See id. at 376 (holding that the government engaged in outrageous conduct in 
violation of the guarantees of due process when the investigating officer initiated the 
escalation of sexual contact with the suspect). 
 80. See id. (holding that “outrageous” government conduct occurs when the methods 
violate the “concept of fundamental fairness inherent” of due process). 
 81. See id. (stating that government conduct is sufficiently outrageous when a police 
officer in a prostitution investigation initiates sexual contact that is not required for the 
collection of evidence). 
 82. See generally id. at 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (reaffirming the belief in 
fundamental fairness but ultimately not delineating an exhaustive list of violative 
instances of government conduct). 
 83. See id. at 374 (explaining the concept of fundamental fairness inherent in the due 
process). 
 84. See id. at 375 (stating that a “sex-for-money” exchange involves intimacy and is 
quite different than other vice operations where police officers participate in illegal 
activities). 
 85. See id. (explaining why the court declines to use an “outrageousness” test 
established in a previous illegal substance case because the core issues are fundamentally 
different). 
 86. See id. (explaining that the court views sexual contact between police and 
suspects different from narcotics stings and therefore refused to utilize the same analysis 
established in previous cases). 
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stating that there is something inherently different in sexual contact, the court 
acknowledges that investigative procedures vary and must reflect the nature 
of the investigation.87  The court in Burkland, however, only stated that 
outrageousness depends on whether the police themselves engaged in 
criminal or improper conduct that was repugnant to a sense of justice.88  The 
court did not define the outrageousness factor or what constitutes excessive 
government overinvolvement in the crime, but only acknowledged that there 
was a violation in the case at hand.89  This framework is necessary in all cases 
regarding sexual contact between an undercover police officer and a suspect 
because it is critical to understand the role of bodily integrity vis-à-vis 
invasive government tactics and their impact on due process procedures.90  
The invasiveness of sexual contact between police officers and prostitutes 
reflects key issues of bodily integrity because undercover police officers use 
a suspect’s body and sexual actions to gather evidence by controlling the 
suspect’s body to incriminate the suspect.91  A suspect, regardless of the 
crime they are being investigated for, is entitled to inviolability and the right 
of self-determination for their bodies.92  By concealing their identities as 
police officers, undercover officers are stripping away a suspect’s right to 
consent because suspected prostitutes are unaware that they are being 
sexually utilized for their own prosecution and conviction.93 
The ambiguity of the outrageousness test enables police officers to engage 
in sexual contact with suspected prostitutes on a discretionary basis, 
 
 87. See id. (reiterating that stings involving sexual contact should be evaluated 
differently than other vice stings). 
 88. See id. at 376 n.2. (explaining that although the factors used in undercover illegal 
drug cases are inapplicable in the prostitution context, the question of “whether the police 
engaged in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of justice” supports the 
court’s conclusion that outrageous government occurred in this case). 
 89. See id. at 374 (stating that when government conduct is sufficiently outrageous 
that it is repugnant to the criminal justice system and shocking to a universal sense of 
justice, it violates the right to due process). 
 90. See id. at 375 (reiterating how the courts view sexual contact between police and 
suspects in a prostitution sting differently than a narcotics sting or any other vice sting). 
 91. See id. (implying that some sexual contact is justified by the need to gather 
evidence sufficient to arrest the target of the investigation for the offense). 
 92. See Does v. District of Columbia., 374 F. Supp. 2d 107, 118 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(holding that the right to bodily integrity is of “constitutional magnitude,” and intruding 
upon that right requires a showing of overriding justification and medical 
appropriateness). 
 93. See State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 664 (Iowa 2018) (holding that if 
one person’s consent to engage in a sexual encounter with another was obtained through 
the other actor’s fraudulent misrepresentations that he is someone else, there is no 
consent). 
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regardless of whether that evidence is needed, so long as officers provide 
some pretextual reason that justifies the contact.94  Although the Burkland 
case can be seen as a step forward, the court refused to sufficiently define 
the range of conduct that is considered outrageous.95  This oversight has led 
to confusion and inconsistency for cases of suspected prostitutes discovered 
through undercover prostitution stings.96 
B.  Sexual Contact with Prostitution Suspects Strips Them of Their Due 
Process Rights Because Such Contact Violates Their Right to Bodily 
Integrity. 
Sexual contact between police officers and prostitutes strips prostitutes of 
their due process rights because such contact violates their right to bodily 
integrity.97 The practice of sexual contact between officers and prostitutes 
invokes a serious power imbalance between the authorities and suspects.98  
This imbalance can lead to a violation of due process specifically because 
consent is so unclear.99  A lack of affirmative consent in a prostitution sting 
operation can provide police officers with opportunities to abuse prostitutes 
because investigations are often secret and the prostitutes and undercover 
officers are usually the sole witnesses to the probative interactions.100  By 
lacking the clarity of consent, undercover police officers are wandering into 
dangerous territory where there is a strong potential for constitutional 
 
 94. See State v. Morris, 272 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn. 1978) (stating that it did not 
consider a police officer exposing his penis to a suspect as “outrageous conduct” because 
the police officer claimed that it was necessary to maintain his cover). 
 95. See Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 376 (mentioning that unnecessary participation in 
sexual contact is outrageous); see also Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, 983 A.2d 784, 
789 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (holding that excessive and gratuitous sexual contact between 
a police informant and a suspected prostitute was outrageous). 
 96. See Sagelbaum, supra note 36 (providing examples of different cases where 
courts applied inconsistent analyses creating varying results). 
 97. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 454 (stating that, in sexual contact between police 
and prostitutes, there is a theft of services and an imbalance or lack of reciprocity). 
 98. See Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 376 (stating that where an officer’s behavior is so 
shocking and inappropriate that it is considered outrageous by the courts, it violates the 
Constitution). 
 99. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 467 (discussing cases in which police officers 
abused prostitutes during the course of a sting operation); see also Urbansky, supra note 
37, at 752 (stating that consent obtained through misrepresentation can be viewed as non-
consent and that such conduct should not be tolerated by the government). 
 100. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 465 (describing how the situational context can 
provide a setting where officers can abuse the suspects that they are investigating). 
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abuse.101  Sexual contact between undercover police officers and their 
suspects is a physical and legal violation of due process because the sexual 
encounter can serve as an exhibition of the officer’s dominance over the 
suspect.102  The nature of the sexual contact puts the prostitute in the position 
of a suspect while the officer represents government authority.103  This 
dynamic is problematic because these sexual relationships are criminalized 
in other contexts, but are considered lawful if the government can justify that 
the contact was necessary.104 
Prostitutes often claim violations of due process post-arrest, after 
undercover investigations that involve sexual contact with police officers is 
concluded.105  Sexual contact between police officers and prostitutes 
inherently violates prostitutes’ due process rights because the police officers 
are attaining evidence in a manner that is inappropriate and invasive.106  As 
a person, a prostitute is entitled to bodily autonomy and integrity. When an 
undercover police officer participates in sexual contact with a suspected 
prostitute, the officer strips her of the Constitutional rights to a fair 
investigation and proceedings.107  Everyone, including suspects, have the 
right to refuse consent to sexual contact or intercourse.108  When an 
undercover police officer misrepresents his identity as a “john” to convince 
a suspect to have sexual contact with him, he denies the suspect the right to 
bodily autonomy because he is obtaining consent through misrepresentation 
 
 101. See id. (asserting how undercover stings often allow for potential abuse because 
of the intimacy of the encounter). 
 102. See id. at 466 (explaining how police officers can use their physical presence to 
intimidate or coerce suspects into submission). 
 103. See id. at 466 (asserting that a sexual encounter between a police officer and a 
suspect may lead to an unfair power dynamic where the suspect might not receive their 
due process or fair investigation). 
 104. See State v. Burkland, 775 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (stating that 
sexual contact is permissible when intended to gain evidence of a crime). 
 105. See Walters, supra note 12, at 464 (explaining that defendants have challenged 
sexual contact between suspects and police officers, often utilizing the due process 
defense). 
 106. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the conviction 
was obtained by methods that offended the Due Process Clause and that the officers’ 
behavior was so shocking that it violated the Constitution). 
 107. See U.S. CONST. AMEN. XIV, § 1. (stating that “[n]o state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). 
 108. See State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Iowa 2018) (finding no 
consent when the defendant used deception to pose as another person to whom the victim 
did consent to having sexual relations). 
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and fraud.109  When sexual contact occurs between a police officer and his 
suspect, there is a potential for the undercover officer to use his “authority 
and physical presence to subordinate the suspect”.110  When a police officer 
utilizes sex deceptively to apprehend a suspect, not only is the police officer 
committing a serious intrusion on a suspect’s bodily autonomy, but he is 
establishing a dangerous precedent for unlimited police discretion when 
conducting undercover investigations involving prostitution.111 
The Cuervelo Test, despite establishing a rule, is lacking and misguided 
because the test permits sexual contact between undercover police officers 
and prostitutes.112  Because of the inherent nature of prostitution, undercover 
officers are inciting and enabling prostitutes to participate in an exchange of 
sex for money while depriving them of due process.113  Courts have become 
increasingly resistant of the due process argument in prostitution cases.114  
Referring back to the Cuervelo Test, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that a 
“generalized claim of outrageous misconduct based on the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is difficult to make out.”115  Additionally, 
the Supreme Court has not articulated any useful standards for the 
application of the outrageousness defense.116  Courts are often hesitant to 
dismiss charges because of due process violations involving police conduct 
 
 109. See id. at 664 (holding that if one person’s consent to engage in a sexual 
encounter with another was obtained through the other’s misrepresentation that he is 
someone else, there is no consent). 
 110. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 466 (citing Mary Ellen Gale, Calling in the Girl 
Scouts: Feminist Legal Theory and Police Misconduct, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 691, 698 
(2001)) (stating that there is high potential for officers to use their authority and physical 
presence to subordinate and intimidate suspects, stripping suspects of their due process 
protection). 
 111. See id. (explaining police misconduct is linked to stereotypic and aggressive 
masculinity which focuses “on the legal and physical power to subdue, subordinate, and 
dehumanize the people who become the targets of law enforcement”). 
 112. See Walters, supra note 12, at 470 (stating that the court in Burkland permits 
sexual contact and that any standard without an omnibus prohibition against sexual 
contact enables the victimization of prostitutes by law enforcement agents). 
 113. See id. at 476 (stating that a standard that allows undercover police officers 
unfettered sexual contact with prostitutes creates a significant power imbalance). 
 114. See id. at 454 (explaining that courts are reluctant to hear due process claims 
involving allegations of outrageous behavior). 
 115. See United States v. Jones, 13 F.3d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that the 
outrageous conduct based on due process doctrine is “moribund” and that courts have 
rejected its application constantly). 
 116. See State v. Morris, 272 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn. 1978) (explaining that the 
Supreme Court has never defined what constitutes a violation of due process under 
circumstances that implicate the outrageousness defense). 
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that is morally questionable but not “outrageous.”117  The act of sexual 
intercourse and sexual contact, in general, is unlike any other police officer 
practice because the profession of prostitution involves a person’s body and 
the intimacy of the subjects engaging in the act.118  Sexual acts are more 
personal than other types of transactions, and utilizing sexual contact as a 
means of evidence gathering breaks the molds of typical undercover 
operations.119  Utilizing sexual contact as an investigative tool means abusing 
an individual’s rights due to the invasiveness of police officer’s 
investigation.120 
The courts often reject the due process argument and are dismissive of 
claims of outrageous government conduct because they view a prostitute’s 
behavior as “overwhelming evidence of guilt.”121  In practice, a court could 
refuse to convict a defendant because the law enforcement methods to bring 
about the conviction directly implicate a suspect’s due process right to bodily 
integrity.122  If the government utilizes sexual contact as a method of 
gathering evidence to subsequently arrest a prostitute, the courts must 
dismiss the charges, as sexual contact is inherently invasive in nature and 
cannot be valid evidence in a case.123 
C.  Current Elements of Prostitution Are Overly Broad Because They Do 
 
 117. See Walters, supra note 12, at 465 (asserting that courts are reluctant to dismiss 
charges against a defendant when police conduct is “morally objectionable,” but not 
outrageous). 
 118. See Urbansky, supra note 37, at 745 (asserting that physical contact and intimacy 
between an undercover agent and their suspect becomes outrageous as a matter of 
constitutional law); see also Walters, supra note 12, at 467 (stating that sex acts are more 
personal and volatile). 
 119. Walters, supra note 12, at 466 (explaining that the justifications for sexual 
contact between police officers and suspects over-emphasize the agency and free will of 
those who engage in this type of contact). 
 120. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 465 (explaining that fraud involving another’s body 
adds a troubling element, beyond that occurring with the mere exchange of tangible 
objects). 
 121. See Urbansky, supra note 37, at 740 (stating that ignoring the tactics utilized by 
police officers to obtain evidence because a defendant was “clearly guilty” denies due 
process protection). 
 122. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (holding that courts may 
refuse to convict a defendant because, the methods employed on behalf of the 
government to bring about conviction are morally wrong, ethically controversial, and 
violative of due process, even if the defendant is guilty). 
 123. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the conviction 
was obtained by methods that offended the Due Process Clause and that the officers’ 
behavior was so shocking that it violated the Constitution). 
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Not Require an Exchange of Money for Sexual Contact 
It is necessary to raise the standard for the crime of prostitution because 
the current legal definition is too broad and expansive.124  Because such a 
low threshold is required to establish the crime of prostitution, courts are 
unable to develop accurate and effective jurisprudential theories regarding 
the criminality of prostitution.125  The Cuervelo Test and the Burkland 
Analysis are ineffective legal tests because they only address the superficial 
issues of sexual contact in undercover prostitution stings.126  The courts in 
Cuervelo and Burkland ignore the reality that prostitution’s current 
definition allows police officers to violate a suspected prostitute’s due 
process rights to bodily autonomy and privacy.  The current definition of 
prostitution creates a legal framework where an individual is suspected of 
prostitution for simply agreeing to engage in prostitution, without either 
actually having sexual contact for money or is in a position where she is 
defrauded into participating in sexual contact with a police officer.127  The 
outrageousness tests enable police officers to go further and engage in sexual 
contact with suspects to gather additional evidence and possibly entrap those 
who otherwise might have revoked their consent.128  The outrageousness 
tests also allows courts to sideline the due process issues by creating a 
general premise of what does and does not violate due process, unlike a 
bright line rule which is necessary. 
The current definition of prostitution should not be maintained. Police 
officers are wasting a substantial amount of resources to investigate and 
arrest prostitutes that have not even committed the actual exchange of sexual 
activity for money.129  Further, the definition creates confusion within the 
 
 124. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 474 (citing State v. Thoreson, No. A06-454, 2007 
WL 1053205, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 10 2007) (Randall, J., dissenting) (discussing 
that sexual contact is not necessary if the elements of the crime have been presented 
within the course of the investigation). 
 125. See id. (explaining that the mere offering to provide sexual services for a price 
constitutes a crime). 
 126. See generally United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 567 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(focusing only on the sexual contact between the government agent and the suspect). 
 127. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.321 (West 2011) (asserting that “prostitution” 
means being hired, offering to be hired, or agreeing to be hired by another individual to 
engage in sexual penetration or sexual contact). 
 128. See generally State v. Burkland, 775 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) 
(stating that officers are allowed to participate in sexual contact if they believe it is 
necessary to gather evidence). 
 129. See Julie Pearl, The Highest Paying Customers: America’s Cities and the Costs 
of Prostitution Control, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 4, 769-770 (1987) (explaining that police in 
sixteen of the nation’s largest cities will likely continue spending increased amounts of 
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courts because outrageousness is not outlined or defined.130  A new definition 
requiring an actual exchange of payment for sexual contact or services more 
fairly represents the conduct being targeted and establishes a bright line rule 
that would be better suited for the courts.131  By providing a new definition 
of prostitution, and delineating a new bright line rule for fairly evaluating 
probative conduct, courts would more consistently analyze allegations of 
prostitution.132 
This new standard would have a significant impact on undercover 
prostitution stings and drastically change the legal procedure of these types 
of operations in the future.133  With this new standard, the only way that 
undercover police officers could “bust” a prostitute would be to participate 
in sexual contact with the suspect in exchange for payment to actually prove 
the crime of prostitution.134  If it were merely an offer, suggestion, or 
implication of sexual activity in exchange for payment, a suspect could 
always revoke her consent, claim that she changed her mind, or otherwise 
renounce the verbal exchange.135  By actually engaging in sexual contact, 
undercover officers could prove the crime of prostitution by demonstrating 
a transaction based on sexual activity.136  Although this new standard seems 
like it would solve the ambiguity and abstruseness of arresting and 
prosecuting prostitutes, in actuality, it encourages a violation of prostitutes’ 
due process rights because it denies them the right to bodily integrity.137 
 
time making prostitution arrests, taking time away from more serious offenses). See id. 
at 769 (stating that highly skilled vice officers dedicate thousands of weekly hours 
devoted to prostitution stings representing tremendous opportunity costs). 
 130. See Walters, supra note 12, at 465. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 465 (explaining that a bright line rule is necessary for effective oversight 
and legal analysis in the context of prostitution cases). 
 133. See Pearl, supra note 129, at 790 (stating that an efficient way to lower the cost 
of prostitution investigation is to eliminate or cut the undercover preparation needed to 
make an arrest). 
 134. See Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 376 (holding that although sexual contact was 
permitted as long as it was not considered “outrageous,” sexual contact was not 
necessary). 
 135. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 463 (quoting a commentator who stated “[a]s long 
as these laws are on the books, the substance of the violation, and its consensual and 
secret structure, practically requires a degree of participation by the state”). 
 136. See id. (explaining that to enforce prostitution laws, law enforcement must 
embroil themselves in the crime). 
 137. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705 (1997) (stating that the 
Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interfere with a person’s decisions about 
bodily integrity); see also Burkland, 775 N.W.2d at 376 (overturning a conviction where 
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III.  POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
American society has determined that prostitution is morally wrong and 
has implemented laws to attempt to curb the practice.  It is clear that 
undercover prostitution stings pose a unique problem on law enforcement 
and the courts.138  Undercover prostitution stings involve a police officer 
going undercover as a “john” and attempting to “catch” a suspect engaging 
in prostitution.139  The problem with this scenario is that the laws prescribing 
the legal elements of prostitution are so ambiguous that they allow police 
officers to arrest a suspected prostitute without evidence of payment in 
exchange for sexual contact.  Laws permitting an undercover officer to arrest 
a prostitute simply based on an agreement to engage in sexual contact alone 
are ineffective, and allows for the subjugation of a vulnerable class of people 
without the suspects ever actually committing the crime that the law 
targets.140 
If, as argued above, the legal standard for the crime of prostitution is raised 
and the elements to prove the crime of prostitution are narrowed, police 
officers conducting undercover prostitution stings would need to engage in 
sexual contact with the suspects to prove the crime of prostitution. But if this 
change is implemented and undercover police officers are required by law to 
engage in sexual contact with suspects to prove the crime of prostitution, an 
immediate violation of the suspect’s due process rights occurs.  Sexual 
contact between an undercover police officer and a suspect is a violation of 
the suspect’s right to bodily integrity because the undercover police officer 
uses the suspect’s body as a tool against the suspect by engaging in an 
intimate sexual encounter to gather evidence for the suspect’s own 
prosecution.141 
The law of prostitution cannot be narrowed to only refer to the actual 
exchange of payment for sexual contact without enabling police officers in 
 
the evidence was “obtained by methods that offended the Due Process Clause”). 
 138. See Park, supra note 45, at 164 (asserting that consensual prostitution is hard to 
detect since the crime usually occurs in private and none of the participants are likely to 
complain). 
 139. See Walters, supra note 12, at 453 (stating that undercover officers engage in 
sexual conduct with prostitutes in order to continue to investigate them without being 
uncovered as a police officer). 
 140. See supra Part III (C) (stating that having such a low legal standard to establish 
the crime of prostitution allows police officers to arrest without the exchange of payment 
for sexual activity). 
 141. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the conviction 
was obtained by methods that offended the Due Process Clause and that the officers’ 
behavior was so shocking that it violated the Constitution). 
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undercover prostitution stings to have sexual contact with suspects with 
impunity.  For the foregoing reasons, undercover prostitution stings should 
be banned.  Under a narrower definition of prostitution where sexual contact 
in exchange for payment is required, it would be nearly impossible for an 
undercover police officer to prove the crime of prostitution without 
implicating themselves in the same crime and violating a suspect’s due 
process rights.  Therefore, undercover stings should be reserved for vice 
operations when the evidence required for a conviction does not implicate 
the sexual and bodily integrity of a suspect. 
CONCLUSION 
Sexual contact between undercover police officers and prostitutes is a 
violation of the prostitute’s due process right to bodily integrity.142  By 
masquerading as “johns,” police officers deceive suspected prostitutes and 
trick them into participating in sexual contact, raising the question of whether 
prostitutes are able to freely give consent in this context.143 
Courts are ill-prepared and unwilling to address the constitutional 
argument that sexual contact between an undercover police officer and a 
prostitute is a violation of the prostitute’s due process right to bodily 
integrity.144  The Cuervelo Test and subsequent Burkland Analysis do not set 
a bright-line rule defining outrageous government behavior.145  Ultimately 
the current elements of the crime of prostitution are overbroad and unjust 
because they allow police officers to arrest based only on the possibility of 
sexual activity in exchange of money and not the actual act.146 
It is necessary to raise the standard for the crime of prostitution and narrow 
the elements required to prove it.147  The legal definition of prostitution 
 
 142. See id. (asserting that the government should be barred from pursuing 
convictions in instances when evidence is obtained through outrageous or invasive 
methods because the suspect’s due process rights have been violated). 
 143. See Urbansky, supra note 37, at 752 (stating that consent obtained through fraud 
or misrepresentation can be viewed as non-consent in some circumstances). 
 144. See United States v. Jones, 13 F.3d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts 
have consistently rejected the application of the outrageous conduct defense). 
 145. See United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
due process principles may bar the government from obtaining a conviction only if the 
government’s conduct “reach[ed] a demonstrable level of outrageousness”). 
 146. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 471 (concluding that sexual contact should not be 
necessary for a police officer to make an arrest for prostitution). 
 147. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.321 (West 2011) (asserting that “prostitution” 
means being hired, offering to be hired, or agreeing to be hired by another to engage in 
sexual contact). 
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should be limited to an actual exchange of money or payment for sexual 
activity.148  A prostitute should therefore only be charged after the payment 
is received and the sexual act completed.149  But by adopting such a standard, 
undercover cops would need to have sexual contact with prostitutes to gather 
the evidence necessary to arrest them.150  This would undoubtedly lead to 
due process violations because the sexual contact between undercover police 
officers and suspected prostitutes would inherently violate the suspect’s due 
process rights by virtue of the police officer obtaining evidence in an 
outrageous and invasive manner.151  This poses a dilemma, leading to only 
one conclusion: Sexual contact by undercover police officers during 
prostitution investigations should be considered outrageous behavior in 
violation of a prostitute’s due process rights, and should therefore be 
banned.152 
 
 
 148. See Stieler, supra note 11, at 474 (citing State v. Thoreson, No. A06-454, 2007 
WL 1053205, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 10 2007) (Randall, J., dissenting) (discussing 
that there is no need for sexual contact if the elements of the crime have already been 
presented within the course of the investigation). 
 149. See State v. Burkland, 775 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (stating that 
sexual contact is permissible if it was intended to gain evidence of a crime). 
 150. See id. (asserting that sexual contact would be permissible if it was necessary for 
the purposes of the investigation). 
 151. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the conviction 
was “obtained by methods that offended the Due Process Clause and that the officers’ 
behavior was so shocking that it violated the Constitution”). 
 152. See id. at 173-174 (stating that the government should not be allowed to utilize 
investigative means that violate due process rights). 
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